We consider interactive computation of randomized functions between two users with the following privacy requirement: the interaction should not reveal to either user any extra information about the other user's input and output other than what can be inferred from the user's own input and output. We also consider the case where privacy is required against only one of the users. For both cases, we give single-letter expressions for feasibility and optimal rates of communication. Then we discuss the role of common randomness and interaction in both privacy settings.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a function computation problem between two users ( Figure 1 ). They observe memoryless sources (inputs) X and Y , respectively, and communicate interactively over a noiseless communication link to compute randomized functions (outputs) Z 1 and Z 2 , respectively. Common and private randomness which is independent of the inputs X and Y is available to both of them. They want to compute the functions in such a way that neither of them learn any extra information about the other user's input and output other than what their own input and output reveal. We assume that the users are honest-but-curious, i.e., they faithfully follow the given protocol, but will try to infer extra information at the end of the protocol. This secure computation problem is specified by a pair (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ), where q XY is the input distribution and q Z1Z2|XY specifies the randomized function. Our goal is to determine whether a function is securely computable and, when it is computable, determine the optimal rates of interactive communication required. other than what can be inferred from (X n , Z n 1 ). Similar conditions should hold for privacy against Bob. 1 Note that if the two users have access to correlated random variables or a noisy channel, a larger class of functions may be securely computed [17] . A characterization of such stochastic resources which allow any function to be securely computed is given in [18] . In this paper, we do not consider such resources. 2 For malicious cases where colluding users may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol, secure computation of all functions is feasible under a stricter threshold of t < n 3 colluding users [25] , [26] .
where (X i , Y i ), i = 1, . . . , n, are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with distribution q XY . Both users have access to a common random variable W , which is independent of (X n , Y n ) and uniformly distributed over its alphabet W = [1 : 2 nR0 ]. The users interactively communicate in r rounds over a noiseless bidirectional link. Their goal is to securely compute the randomized function q Z1Z2|XY , i.e., to output Z n 1 and Z n 2 , respectively, such that they are (approximately) distributed according to q Z n 1 Z n 2 |X n Y n (z n 1 , z n 2 |x n , y n ) := Π n i=1 q Z1Z2|XY (z 1i , z 2i |x i , y i ) while (approximately) preserving privacy in the sense that the average amount of additional information that a user learns about the input and output of the other user goes to zero as n tends to infinity. We consider this problem in two different cases: (i) when privacy is required against both users, and (ii) when privacy is required against only one of the users. In both cases we wish to determine whether secure computation is feasible in any arbitrary r ∈ N number of rounds and when feasible, characterize the set of achievable rates. Next we formally state the problem assuming that Alice starts the communication. • two randomized decoders p D1 (z n 1 |x n , w, m [1:r] ) and p D2 (z n 2 |y n , w, m [1:r] ).
Let p 
Definition 2. (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely computable in r rounds with privacy against both users if there exists a sequence of protocols Π n such that, for every > 0, there exists a large enough n such that
I(M [1:r] , W ; X n , Z
where q X n ,Y n ,Z n 1 ,Z n 2 (x n , y n , z n 1 , z n 2 ) := Π n i=1 q XY (x i , y i )q Z1Z2|XY (z 1i , z 2i |x i , y i ) . Note that (3) is the privacy condition against Alice. It requires that the rate of additional information that Alice learns about Bob's input and output other than what can be inferred from her own input and output is negligible. Similarly, (4) is the privacy condition against Bob. Definition 3. (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ) is perfectly securely computable in r rounds with privacy against both users if there exists a protocol Π n with n = 1 such that (2)-(4) are satisfied with = 0. For a given function (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ), a rate triple (R 0 , R 12 , R 21 ) is said to be achievable in r rounds with privacy against both users if there exists a sequence of (n, R 0 , R 12 , R 21 ) protocols such that, for every > 0, there exists a large enough n satisfying (2) (r) and so on can also be defined in a similar fashion for the cases when privacy is required only against Alice and privacy is required only against Bob, respectively. For example, for the case when privacy is required only against Alice, the definitions will require (2)-(3) only and not (4) .
III. FEASIBILITY AND RATE REGION
We present single-letter characterizations of securely computable randomized functions and the rate regions. Detailed proofs can be found in Appendix A. The following theorem is about feasibility. Part (i) states that asymptotic secure computability (in r rounds) of a function implies one-shot (i.e., n = 1) perfectly secure computability (in the same number of rounds). Part (ii) shows that asymptotic secure computability depends on the input distribution q XY only through its support, supp(q XY ) := {(x, y) : q XY (x, y) > 0}. In fact, asymptotic secure computability of a function (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ) is preserved even with another input distributionq XY whose support is a subset of supp(q XY ).
Theorem 1. (i) (q XY
q Z1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely computable with privacy against both users using an r-round protocol in which Alice starts the communication if and only if there exists a conditional p.m.f. p(u [1:r] |x, y, z 1 , z 2 ) satisfying
Z 2 − (U [1:r] , Y ) − (X, Z 1 ), (ii) If a function (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely computable with privacy against both users using an rround protocol, then (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ), where supp(q XY ) ⊆ supp(q XY ), is also asymptotically securely computable with privacy against both users using an r-round protocol. Remark 1. Notice that Alice can generate common randomness by sending some of her private randomness along with the message in the first round. So, the presence or absence of common randomness should not affect the secure computability of a function (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ). As expected, the condition in part (i) does not depend on common randomness. Remark 2. Part (i) of Theorem 1 shows that, for our problem, asymptotic secure computability is equivalent to oneshot perfect secure computability. It is interesting to note that this is not the case for all secure function computation problems. Consider the problem of function computation with privacy against an eavesdropper [24] . Tyagi et al. [24] considers the asymptotic setting where a group of users with correlated inputs interact noiselessly to compute a common function. The privacy requirement is that the amount of information that an eavesdropper learns about the function from the communication vanishes asymptotically. [24, Theorem 2] states that a function g is asymptotically securely computable by two users with privacy against an eavesdropper if H(g(X, Y )) < I(X; Y ) (and only if H(g(X, Y )) ≤ I(X; Y )). In this setup, perfectly secure computability with privacy against an eavesdropper can be defined analogous to the asymptotic secure computability with privacy against an eavesdropper. Below, we give an example of a function which is computable with asymptotic security (with privacy from an eavesdropper) but not with perfect security. Furthermore, unlike part (ii) of Theorem 1, asymptotic secure computability with privacy against an eavesdropper depends on the input distribution q XY not just through its support supp(q XY ) [24, Theorem 2]. Example 1. Consider a doubly symmetric binary source DSBS(a) with joint distribution q XY (x, y) = 0.5(1 − a)1 {x=y} + 0.5a1 {x =y} , a ∈ [0, 0.5] and x, y ∈ {0, 1}. Let the function to be computed by both users is g(x, y) = x ⊕ y, where '⊕' is addition modulo-2. Choose a ∈ (0, 0.5] s.t. h(a) < 1 − h(a) (where h(·) denotes the binary entropy function), so that g is asymptotically securely computable with privacy against the eavesdropper (by [24, Theorem 2] ). We show that there does not exist a protocol that perfectly securely computes g with privacy from an eavesdropper. If g is perfectly securely computable with privacy against an eavesdropper, then there exists some r and a conditional p.m.f p(u [1:r] |x, y) satisfying (5)- (8) with Z 1 = Z 2 = G := g(X, Y ) (for correctness), and I(G; U [1:r] ) = 0 (for privacy against the eavesdropper). For simplicity, we write U for U [1:r] . Suppose there exists a conditional p.m.f. satisfying the above conditions. In particular, we have
(11) implies that I(X ⊕ Y ; Y |U, X) = 0, which in turn implies that H(Y |U, X) = 0 (i.e., Y is a function of (U, X)) since H(Y |U, X, X ⊕ Y ) = 0. Similarly, (12) implies that H(X|U, Y ) = 0, i.e., X is a function of (U, Y ). Now if p(u, x, y) > 0, then we claim that p(u) = p(u, x, y) + p(u,x,ȳ) (x denotes the compliment of x, i.e., x = 1 − x). To see this, if p(u, x, y) > 0, note that p(u, x,ȳ) = 0 since Y is a function of (U, X). Similarly, p(u,x, y) = 0 since X is a function of (U, Y ). Hence, when p(u) > 0, since there exists x, y s.t. p(u, x, y) > 0, we can write p(u) = p(u, x, y) + p(u,x,ȳ). Hence, X ⊕ Y is a function of U as x ⊕ y =x ⊕ȳ, ∀x, y ∈ {0, 1}. This is a contradiction to (13) as a ∈ (0, 0.5]. Therefore, g is not perfectly securely computable with privacy against an eavesdropper.
Remark 3.
If there is no bound on the number of rounds, note that part (i) does not give a computable characterization of asymptotically securely computable functions. This problem, which was partially addressed in [18] , [22] for full support input distributions, remains open.
Proof sketch of Theorem 1: We give a proof sketch here. A detailed proof can be found in Appendix A. For part (i), it is trivial to see the 'if' part since (5)-(10) define an r-round perfectly secure protocol of blocklength one, i.e., the protocol satisfies (2)-(4) with n = 1 and = 0. For the 'only if' part, we first single-letterize the privacy constraints (3) and (4). We then single-letterize (2) and the Markov chains that are implied by the joint distribution in (1) along the lines of two-way source coding of Kaspi [3] , interactive (deterministic) function computation of Ma and Ishwar [5] , and channel simulation of Yassaee et al. [6] . Then by using the continuity of mutual information and total variation distance in the probability simplex, we show that, if a function is computable with asymptotic security, it is also computable with perfect security. For part (ii), we show that a protocol which securely computes (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ) will also securely compute the function (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ), where supp(q XY ) ⊆ supp(q XY ).
Next theorem characterizes the rate region R
Theorem 2. If a function (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely computable with privacy against both users, then R AB−pvt A (r) is given by the set of all non-negative rate triples (R 0 , R 12 , R 21 ) such that
for some conditional p.m.f. p(u [1:r] |x, y, z 1 , z 2 ) satisfying (5)-(10), |U 1 | ≤ |X ||Y||Z 1 ||Z 2 | + 5 and
Remark 4. Inequality (16) on R 0 + R 12 makes the rate region R AB−pvt A (r) possibly asymmetric. This is, in fact, due to the assumption that Alice starts the communication. This is similar to the possible asymmetry of the rate region observed in channel simulation [6, Theorem 1].
Remark 5. Substituting X = Y = ∅ in part (i) of Theorem 1 recovers a result of [23] which states that a distribution q Z1,Z2 is securely computable (i.e., securely sampleable as there are no inputs here) if and only if [28] . To see this, note that C(Z 1 ; Z 2 ) = I(Z 1 ; Z 2 ) + min
Furthermore, when R 0 = 0, Theorem 2 implies that the optimal sum-rate is
This follows from (24) (proved later) and the fact that I(
Remark 6. For a function (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ), which is asymptotically securely computable with privacy against both users using a one round protocol in which Alice starts the communication, (15) purports to give a lower bound on the rate of communication from Bob to Alice. However, note that this lower bound I(Y ; Z 1 |X) is in fact zero. To see this, notice that if a function (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely computable with privacy against both users using a 1-round protocol in which Alice starts the communication, it follows from U − X − Y and (23) (proved later) that I(Y ; Z 1 |X) = 0.
Proof sketch of Theorem 2:
We give a proof sketch here. A detailed proof can be found in Appendix A. Our proof of achievability is along similar lines as the achievability proof of channel simulation [6, Theorem 1] . We modify this proof to give a protocol which also accounts for privacy . For the converse, we first single-letterize the privacy constraints (3) and (4) . The rest of the converse is in the spirit of two-way source coding of Kaspi [3] , interactive (deterministic) function computation of Ma and Ishwar [5] , and channel simulation of Yassaee et al. [6] . This gives a rate region defined by the set of non-negative rate triples (R 0 , R 12 , R 21 ) such that
for conditional p.m.f. p(u [1:r] , z 1 , z 2 |x, y) satisfying (5)- (10) . Notice that constraints (18)-(21) appear in channel simulation [6, Theorem 1] also, where the conditional p.m.f. p(u [1:r] , z 1 , z 2 |x, y) satisfies (5)- (8) . The above region reduces to the form mentioned in Theorem 2 because of simplification possible here due to the additional privacy constraints (9)-(10), which gives us (as shown in the detailed proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix A)
Let us denote the minimum number of rounds required for secure computation by r min , i.e., the smallest r such that there exists auxiliary random variables U [1:r] which makes the function (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ) one-shot perfectly securely computable with either Alice or Bob starting the communication. Note that Theorem 2 is for any fixed number of rounds r. The following corollary gives the region R AB−pvt . Notice that the description of region R AB−pvt does not involve any auxiliary random variables. Corollary 1. If (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely computable with privacy against both users, then R AB−pvt is given by the set of all non-negative rate triples (R 0 , R 12 , R 21 ) such that
Furthermore, R AB−pvt (r min + 1) = R AB−pvt .
Proof of Corollary 1: It suffices to prove that R AB−pvt (r min + 1) = R opt , where R opt is defined to be the set of all non-negative rate tuples (R 0 , R 12 , R 21 ) such that (25)- (27) are satisfied. From Theorem 2 it is easy to see that R AB−pvt (r min + 1) ⊆ R opt . Suppose r min occurs when Alice starts the communication. Then by Theorem 2 there exists random variables U [1:rmin] with conditional p.m.f. p(u [1:rmin] |x, y, z 1 , z 2 ) satisfying (5)- (10) . For the other direction, take a point (R 0 , R 12 , R 21 ) ∈ R opt . We find new random variables U [1:rmin+1] so that (R 0 , R 12 , R 21 ) becomes a point in R AB−pvt B (r min + 1). Define U 1 = ∅ and U i = U i−1 for i > 1. This gives us that (R 0 , R 12 , R 21 ) ∈ R AB−pvt B (r min + 1). Hence (R 0 , R 12 , R 21 ) ∈ R AB−pvt (r min + 1). For computing randomized function (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ) without any privacy guarantees, the cut-set lower bounds can be shown to be (see Appendix B for details) R 12 ≥ I(X; Z 2 |Y ), R 21 ≥ I(Y ; Z 1 |X).
Part (i) of the following theorem states that if a function is securely computable with privacy against both users, then these cut-set lower bounds (for function computation without any privacy requirement) are achievable. The converse is not true in general 3 . However, part (ii) of the theorem states that a converse holds for a class of functions including deterministic functions 4 . Let the rate region R
No-privacy A (r) be defined analogous to R AB−pvt A (r) (except that only correctness condition (2) is required).
) is securely computable in r rounds with privacy against both users, then there exists R 0 such that R 0 , I(X; Z 2 |Y ),
No-privacy A (r), then the function is securely computable in r rounds with privacy against both users.
We prove this in Appendix A. Part (i) will follow from Theorem 2. We prove part (ii) by showing that, for the class of functions mentioned in Theorem 3, any protocol for computation without privacy that meets the cut-set bounds must satisfy the privacy conditions as well.
When privacy is required against only one user:
Note that when privacy is required only against Alice, any function (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ) can be securely computed using a 2-round protocol in which Alice starts the communication. Alice can transmit her input to Bob who can compute the function according to q Z1Z2|XY , and send Z 1 back to Alice. Part (i) of the following theorem considers the feasibility of 1 round protocols. Similar to part (i) of Theorem 2, it states that asymptotic secure computability implies one-shot perfectly secure computability. Part (ii) characterizes the rate region for an arbitrary number of rounds r. 
Furthermore, if a function (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely computable with privacy only against Alice using a 1-round protocol, then (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ), where supp(q XY ) ⊆ supp(q XY ), is also asymptotically securely computable with privacy only against Alice using a 1-round protocol.
(ii) R A−pvt A (r) is given by the set of all non-negative rate triples (R 0 , R 12 , R 21 ) such that
for some conditional p.m.f. p(u [1:r] |x, y, z 1 , z 2 ) satisfying (5)- (8) and (9) .
When privacy is required only against Bob, any function (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ) is securely computable in at most 3 rounds with Alice starting the communication. To see this, note that Alice may transmit nothing in the first round, Bob can transmit his input to Alice in the second round. She can then compute the function according to q Z1Z2|XY , 8 and send Z 2 back to Bob in the third round. Part (i) of the following theorem considers the feasibility of 1 and 2 round protocols. Similar to part (i) of Theorems 2 and 4, it states that asymptotic secure computability implies perfectly secure computability. Part (ii) characterizes the rate region for an arbitrary number of rounds r. (8) and (10), for r = 1, 2. Furthermore, if a function (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely computable with privacy only against Bob using a 1(resp. 2)-round protocol, then (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ), where supp(q XY ) ⊆ supp(q XY ), is also asymptotically securely computable with privacy only against Bob using a 1(resp. 2)-round protocol.
(ii) R B−pvt A (r) is given by the set of all non-negative rate triples (R 0 , R 12 , R 21 ) such that
for some conditional pmf p(u [1:r] |x, y, z 1 , z 2 ) satisfying (5)- (8) and (10) .
Note that similar cardinality bounds on auxiliary random variables as in Theorems 1 and 2 hold for Theorems 4 and 5 also.
IV. ROLE OF INTERACTION AND COMMON RANDOMNESS
When no privacy is required, any function can be computed in two rounds by exchanging the inputs. However, as Ma and Ishwar [5] have shown, there are functions for which more rounds of interaction can strictly improve the communication rate. When privacy is required against both users, if a function is securely computable, depending on the function, by Theorem 1, a certain minimum number of rounds of interaction is required for secure computation. Recall that we defined r min to be the smallest r such that there exists auxiliary random variables U [1:r] which makes the function (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ) asymptotically (and perfectly) securely computable with either Alice or Bob starting the communication. The discussion on the role of interaction below will focus on whether increasing the number of rounds beyond r min helps to reduce the communication rate. On common randomness, it is clear from Remark 1 that its absence does not affect the secure computability of a function. The discussion on the role of common randomness will focus on its effect on the communication rate.
A. Privacy required against both users
It can be inferred from Corollary 1 that when privacy is required against both users, interaction will not help to enlarge the rate region beyond r min + 1 rounds.
• Interaction does not improve the minimum sum-rate, i.e., R AB−pvt sum (r, R 0 ) = R AB−pvt sum (r min , R 0 ), for r ≥ r min , R 0 ≥ 0. Interaction does not help to enlarge the rate region when (i) I(Z 1 ; Z 2 |X, Y ) = 0, e.g., when the functions are deterministic, or (ii) the common randomness rate is large enough.
Fix some R 0 . Since (24)), we get from Theorem 2 that, for any r ≥ r min , the optimal sum-rate R AB−pvt sum
. Since this rate is same for any r ≥ r min , the sum-rate cannot be reduced with more rounds of interaction, i.e., R (17) is redundant. For the same reasons as above, (16) is also redundant and the rate region is characterized by (14) and (15) . Since these do not depend on the auxiliary random variables, the rate region remains the same for all r ≥ r min . When the common randomness rate is large enough, it can be observed from Theorem 2 that the rate region is again characterized by (14) and (15) and hence interaction does not enlarge the rate region. Now, since R AB−pvt sum (r, R 0 ) = R AB−pvt sum (r min , R 0 ), for r ≥ r min , R 0 ≥ 0, we will relax the first argument r of R AB−pvt sum (r, R 0 ) in the sequel and simply write R AB−pvt sum
• For a function q XY , q Z1Z2|XY , common randomness can improve the minimum sum-rate (i.e., R AB−pvt sum (R 0 ) < R AB−pvt sum (0), for all R 0 > 0) if and only if Z 1 and Z 2 are conditionally dependent given (X, Y ). Hence, for deterministic functions, common randomness does not reduce the sum-rate.
Suppose Z 1 and Z 2 are conditionally independent given (X, Y ), i.e., I(Z 1 ; Z 2 |X, Y ) = 0. Since we have (24)), (16) and (17) in Theorem 2 are now redundant. Thus, the characterization of the rate region does not involve the common randomness rate R 0 5 . Hence, the absence of common randomness does not affect the minimum sum-rate when Z 1 and Z 2 are conditionally independent given (X, Y ). Now suppose Z 1 and Z 2 are conditionally dependent given (X, Y ). In the absence of common randomness, the optimal sum-rate, i.e., R AB−pvt sum (0) is I(X; Z 2 |Y ) + I(Y ; Z 1 |X) + I(Z 1 ; Z 2 |X, Y ) for the same reasons as above. In the presence of common randomness of rate R 0 , the sum-rate can be written as R AB−pvt sum
B. Privacy required against one user
• When privacy is required against only one user (say, Bob), r min +1 rounds may strictly improve the minimum sum-rate, i.e., there exists a function (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ) such that R B−pvt
We show this through an example where both users compute a deterministic function of (X, Y ), and privacy against Bob alone is required. sum (r, R 0 ) by relaxing R 0 . We show that the optimum sum-rate for two round protocols, R B−pvt sum (2) is log m + 1/2 + m bits (all rates in the sequel are in bits). Then we give a three round protocol, with Alice starting the communication, which has a sum-rate of R B−pvt sum (3) = log m + 1/2 + 1. We also show that log m + 1/2 + 1 is the minimum achievable sum-rate with any r (r ≥ 3) rounds of protocol. Suppose there exists a two round protocol with Alice starting the communication. If Bob is able to compute the function with a single message from Alice, then [4, Theorem 1] gives that R 12 should be greater than or equal to the conditional graph entropy of the confusability graph [4] . For this example, it can be easily verified that R 12 ≥ log m + 1 which is strictly greater than the cut-set bound log m + 1/2. This shows that secure computation is not possible with a two round protocol with Alice starting the communication (because a statement similar to Theorem 3 holds when privacy is required only against Bob with r = 2 rounds). Now let us consider a two round protocol with Bob starting the communication. From Theorem 5, there exists random variables U 1 , U 2 satisfying
Then there exists u 1 , y and y , where y = y such that p(y, u 1 ) > 0 and p(y ,
Since (33) and (34) imply that there exists u 2 such that
Since Z is a deterministic function of (U 1 , U 2 , X) (this follows from (32)), (35) and (36) above imply that
for somez. This is a contradiction. Hence, H(Y |U 1 ) = 0 for any choice of U 1 and
Therefore, to preserve decodability and privacy, the minimum possible R 12 is m which also shows that the function is not computable in 1 round with Alice starting the communication. Rate R 21 is lower bounded by H(Z|Y ), the cut-set bound, which is equal to log m + 1/2. So the sum-rate is lower bounded by log m + 1/2 + m. This can be achieved by first Bob communicating U 1 = Y to Alice, and Alice computing Z and communicating U 2 = Z to Bob. It is easy to see that this does not violate any privacy requirements. Thus, the optimum sum-rate for two round protocols is R |X) = log m + 1/2 + 1 which is strictly less than the optimum sum-rate for two round protocols. In Appendix C, we show that log m + 1/2 + 1 is the optimum sum-rate for any r round protocol with r ≥ 3.
• Only one user computes and privacy is required against the other user: interaction and common randomness do not help to enlarge the rate region.
Let us consider the case where only Bob computes (i.e., Z 1 = ∅) and privacy against Alice is required. Note that every function (q XY , q Z2|XY ) is securely computable in one round with privacy only against Alice 6 since Alice may send X to Bob, and Bob, having Y as his input, may output Z 2 according to q Z2|XY . By substituting Z 1 = ∅ in Theorem 4, it can be observed that the only active constraint is R 12 ≥ I(X; U (5)- (6), and
Now let us consider R 12 = min I(X; U [1:r] |Y ), where the minimization is only under (37) and (38). Then R * 12 ≥ R 12 . Further, it can be observed that R 12 is the minimum rate achievable when r = 1. So R * 12 ≤ R 12 . This shows that the rate region is given by
This shows that interaction and the presence of common randomness do not help in this case.
The randomized function q Z|XY described by the above matrix has ternary X and Z alphabets and binary Y alphabet. Specifically, X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 }, Y = {y 1 , y 2 }, and Z = {0, e, 1}, where e denotes the erasure symbol. The input distribution is as follows:
. When Bob's input is y 1 , the output is always an erasure. When Bob's input is y 2 , the randomized function q Z|X,Y =y2 behaves as an erasure channel with binary input in {x 1 , x 3 } and parameter p ∈ [0, 1]:
V. THE COMMUNICATION COST OF SECURITY -AN EXAMPLE
Recall that Theorem 3 states that if a function is securely computable with privacy against both users, then cutset lower bounds (for function computation without any privacy) are achievable, i.e., when a function is securely computable with privacy against both users, there is no communication cost of security. In this section, we study the communication cost of security when privacy is required against only one user and compare it with the communication cost of non-private computation. It turns out that, for a function which is securely computable with privacy against only one user, the requirement of privacy, in general, may lead to a larger optimal rate. We consider, arguably, the simplest special case of two-user secure computation where only Bob computes a function using a single round of transmission from Alice. We also compare our results with the function computation without any privacy requirement. For the sake of comparison, below we state a result from [6] , specialized to our setting (i.e., one-way communication from Alice to Bob and only Bob computing), for the optimal rate required when there is no privacy requirement. We denote the optimal rate by R No-Privacy when there is no common randomness. Note that [6] considered a more general model (where Alice and Bob communicate back and forth for multiple rounds, and both of them may produce potentially different outputs), and obtained a single-letter expression for the optimal rate, when Alice and Bob interact for arbitrary but finite number of rounds.
where cardinality of U satisfies |U| ≤ |X | · |Y| · |Z| + 2.
We define R AB−pvt , R A−pvt and R B−pvt as the infima of all the achievable rates in the absence of common randomness when privacy is required, respectively, against both users, only against Alice, and only against Bob. Theorems 2, 4 and 5 give us expressions for R AB−pvt , R A−pvt and R B−pvt , respectively. Before we discuss the example, we present an alternative expression for R A−pvt in terms of conditional graph entropy [4] , H G (X|Y ) (see Definition 6 in Section VI-A) which simplifies the computation. Figure 2 can be securely computable with privacy against both users (R AB−pvt denotes the optimal rate). For p = 0, R AB−pvt = 1/2, for p = 1, R AB−pvt = 0. This is, in fact, consistent with Theorem 3, which states that if a function is securely computable with privacy against both users, then cut-set lower bound (for function computation without any privacy) is achievable. In contrast, when the function is securely computable with privacy against only one user, the requirement of privacy, in general, may lead to a larger optimal rate. The red curve on the top is for privacy only against Bob (R B−pvt denotes the optimal rate). The olive green dashed curve is for privacy only against Alice (R A−pvt denotes the optimal rate); this curve does not depend on the value of p for 0 ≤ p < 1, because R A−pvt is equal to the conditional graph entropy, which depends only on the input distribution for 0 ≤ p < 1.
earlier, if p = 1, the rate required is zero, i.e., R AB−pvt = 0. If p = 0, then R AB−pvt = I(X; Z|Y ) = 1/2. b) Privacy only against Alice: By Proposition 1, the optimum rate is R A−pvt = H G (X|Y ). The characteristic graph (see Section VI-A) corresponding to the randomized function (q XY , q Z|XY ) is G = (V, E), where V = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } and E = {{x 1 , x 3 }}, i.e., G has a single edge between x 1 and x 3 . The optimal rate R A−pvt is equal to the conditional graph entropy H G (X|Y ) of this graph G. Note that there are two maximal independent sets {x 1 , x 2 } and {x 2 , x 3 } in G. It can be shown easily that I(W ; X|Y ) is minimized when
This yields I(W ; X|Y ) = 1/2, which implies that H G (X|Y ) = 1/2. We obtain R A−pvt = 1/2 for 0 ≤ p < 1. (When p = 1, the graph G does not have any edge, and the rate required is zero, i.e., R A−pvt = 0.) c) Privacy only against Bob: From Theorem 5, the optimal rate for asymptotically securely computing (q XY , q Z|XY ) with privacy against Bob is equal to
First we show that this randomized function is securely computable with privacy against Bob, i.e., we give a random variable U that satisfies the Markov chains in (39). For that we give an encoder-decoder pair (p U |X , p Z|U Y ) that perfectly securely computes (q XY , q Z|XY ) with privacy against Bob. The random variable U has ternary alphabet
is defined as follows:
It can be verified that the above encoder-decoder pair (p U |X , p Z|U Y ) satisfies perfect privacy against Bob (i.e., it satisfies the Markov chain U − (Y, Z) − X) and perfect correctness (i.e., p Z|X=x,Y =y = q Z|X=x,Y =y for every x, y such that q XY (x, y) > 0). We will now show that the choice of auxiliary random variable in (40) is optimal for the optimization problem in (39). Consider any p U |XY Z which satisfies the constraints in (39). Note that when Y = y 1 , Z = e with probability 1. This implies that I(Z; U |Y = y 1 ) = 0, which simplifies the rate-expression for R B−pvt to the following:
To evaluate the expression in (41), it is sufficient to take minimization over encoder-decoder pairs (p U |X , p Z|U,Y =y2 ) that perfectly securely compute (q X|Y =y2 , q Z|X,Y =y2 ) with privacy against Bob. Consider such an encoder-decoder
This means that when Bob has y 2 as his input, then U determines
Thus, any encoder-decoder pair (p U |X , p Z|U Y ) that perfectly securely computes the randomized function of Figure 2 achieves the same value for I(Z; U |Y ). In particular, the pair defined in (40) also achieves the optimal rate in (41), which is equal to
d) No privacy: From Theorem 6, the optimal rate is equal to
Note that minimization in the above expression is over all encoder-decoder pairs (p U |X , p Z|U Y ) such that they induce the correct q Z|XY (.|x, y) for every x ∈ X , y ∈ Y for which q XY (x, y) > 0. Note that when Y = y 1 , Z = e with probability 1. Now, for any (p U |X , p Z|U Y ), define another encoder-decoder pair (q U |X , q Z|U Y ) as follows:
It can be verified that (q U |X , q Z|U Y ) is a valid encoder-decoder pair that correctly computes the randomized function of Figure 2 . Observe that I(X, Z; U |Y = y 1 )| qUXZ|Y =y 1 = 0 and I(X, Z; U |Y = y 2 )| qUXZ|Y =y 2 = I(X, Z; U |Y = y 2 )| pUXZ|Y =y 2 . This implies that I(X, Z; U |Y ) qUXY Z ≤ I(X, Z; U |Y ) pUXY Z , which further implies that the expression for R No-Privacy from (42) reduces to the following:
To evaluate the expression in (44), it is sufficient to take minimization over encoder-decoder pairs (p U |X , p Z|U,Y =y2 ) 7 When we restrict Bob's input to y2, then Alice's input X takes values in {x1, x3}. For securely computing (q X|Y =y 2 , q Z|X,Y =y 2 ) with p ∈ (0, 1), we have k = 3 and α
= (0, 1). For definitions of k and α (y) 's, see discussion on page 19 .
This figure is for Y = y 2 . The p U XZ|Y =y2 which minimizes the rate-expression in (44) is a concatenation of two symmetric erasure channels -the first channel has parameter p 1 , the second channel has parameter p 2 , and
that compute (q X|Y =y2 , q Z|X,Y =y2 ) with perfect correctness. We will argue that the (p U |X , p Z|U,Y =y2 ) shown in Figure 4 includes a minimizer for (44). It is a concatenation of two symmetric erasure channels -first erasure channel is with parameter p 1 ∈ [0, 1] and the second erasure channel is with parameter
The reason that this choice of encoder-decoder pair (which is given in Figure 4 ) is optimal for our problem is given next:
The minimization in (44) is related to Wyner's common information problem [28] , where Alice gets an input sequence X n and Bob wants to generate an output sequence Z n such that (X n , Z n ) is close to the desired (X n , Z n ) in 1 -distance, where (X i , Z i )'s are i.i.d. according to a given q XZ . The minimum rate required for this problem is equal to the Wyner's common information, which is defined as min pU|XZ I(X, Z; U ), where minimization is taken over all p U |XZ such that X − U − Z is a Markov chain. The p U |XZ that satisfies X − U − Z and achieves the least value for I(X, Z; U ) was obtained by Cuff [29, Section II-F] and is presented in Figure 4 (without Y ). The expression that we want to compute is min pU|X,Y =y 2 ,Z I(X, Z; U |Y = y 2 ), where minimization is taken over all p U |X,Y =y2,Z such that X − U − Z is a Markov chain. Note that we are also computing the Wyner common information for the joint distribution over X × Z given by the conditional distribution q XZ|Y =y2 . So, the same encoder-decoder pair (p U |X , p Z|U,Y =y2 ) from Figure 4 also minimizes the rate expression in (44).
With this (p U |X , p Z|U,Y =y2 ), the objective function in (44) becomes I(X, Z; Figure 4 has two parameters p 1 , p 2 ∈ [0, 1], which must satisfy the constraint (1 − p 1 )(1 − p 2 ) = 1 − p. Hence, the minimization in (44) can be taken over all
Comparison: For convenience, we write the optimal rate expressions for asymptotic security in all the four privacy settings, and plot these in Figure 3 .
VI. PERFECT SECURITY: ONE ROUND OF COMMUNICATION; ONLY BOB COMPUTES
We discuss perfect security setting for the simple special case in this last section, i.e., only Bob produces an output and there is a single round of transmission from Alice. Upper and lower bounds on the optimal expected length of transmission are obtained.
A. Preliminaries
Most of our results in this section are stated in terms of various information theoretic quantities that are defined on graphs which arise from randomized function computation. For a given (q XY , q Z|XY ), we define the following characteristic graph G = (X , E), where
There is a probability distribution q X on the vertices of G. The intuition behind this definition of a graph comes from the randomized function computation, where Alice and Bob have inputs X and Y , respectively, and Bob wants to produce a randomized function q Z|XY of these inputs. Suppose x, x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z are such that q XY (x, y) > 0, q XY (x , y) > 0 and q Z|XY (z|x, y) = q Z|XY (z|x , y). Observe that Alice cannot send the same message if her input is x or x : because if she does so, and Bob happens to have y as his input (which happens with positive probability), then there is no way Bob can produce an output with correct distribution. This means that Alice has to distinguish through the message whether her input is x or x . This distinction is achieved by defining a graph on X and putting an edge between x and x . An edge {x , x } means that Alice cannot send the same message if her input is x or x . Per contra, if {x, x } / ∈ E, then Alice does not need to distinguish between x and x , because, if q XY (x, y) > 0, q XY (x , y) > 0 for some y ∈ Y, then q Z|XY (z|x, y) = q Z|XY (z|x , y) holds for every z ∈ Z. So, if {x, x } / ∈ E, then x and x are equivalent from the function computation point of view. We say that a coloring c : X → {0, 1} * of the vertices of G is proper, if both the vertices of any edge {x, x } have distinct colors, i.e., c(x) = c(x ). Note that c(X) is a random variable with entropy
where image(c) is the image of the function c, c −1 is the inverse of c, and q X (c −1 (γ)) for a color γ is defined as q X (c −1 (γ)) := x∈X :c(x)=γ q X (x). Note that the function c partitions X into color classes, i.e., the set of vertices assigned the same color, and H(c(X)) is the entropy of this partition. The chromatic entropy H χ (G, X) of G is defined as the lowest entropy of such a partition produced by any proper coloring of G:
Definition 5 (Chromatic Entropy, [30] ). For a given (q XY , q Z|XY ), the chromatic entropy of G is defined as
where c(X) denotes the induced distribution on colors by the coloring c.
An independent set of G is a collection U ⊆ X of vertices such that no two vertices of U are connected by an edge in G. Let W denote the random variable corresponding to the independent sets in G, and let Γ (G) be the set of all independent sets in G.
Definition 6 (Conditional Graph Entropy, [4] ). For a given (q XY , q Z|XY ), the conditional graph entropy of G is defined as H G (X|Y ) := min
where minimum is taken over all the conditional distributions p W |X such that p W |X (w|x) > 0 only if x ∈ w.
By the data-processing inequality, this minimization can be restricted to W 's ranging over maximal independent sets of G [ As shown in Figure 5 , Alice and Bob get X and Y , respectively, as their inputs, where (X, Y ) is distributed according to q XY ; Alice sends a message M to Bob, and based on (M, Y ), Bob produces Z as the output, which is required to be distributed according to q Z|XY while preserving privacy. We allow variable length codes. Any scheme for computing (q XY , q Z|XY ) is defined as a pair of stochastic maps (p U |X , p Z|U Y ), where U takes values in {0, 1} * such that all the binary strings in the support set of U are prefix-free. We call p U |X the encoder and p Z|U Y the decoder. Let L(U ) denote the random variable corresponding to the length of U in bits and the expected length E[L(U )] denote the rate of code. In this section, we give bounds on the optimal rate of communication for the three cases of privacy, i.e., privacy against both users, privacy only against Alice and privacy only against Bob. In this section, we will only consider the case when there is no common randomness available to the users. However, we show below in Lemma 1 that this is without loss of generality whenever privacy against Alice is required (i.e., when privacy is required against both Alice and Bob or only against Alice). When privacy is required only against Bob, we show through an example (Example 4) later in this section that common randomness helps to improve the rate of communication.
Lemma 1.
When privacy against Alice is required (i.e., when privacy is required against both users or when privacy is required only against Alice), common randomness does not help to improve the optimal rate.
Proof: Let (p U |XW , p Z|W U Y ) be an encoder-decoder pair (note that this pair takes in to account the common randomness also in addition to the definition of encoder-decoder pair mentioned in the paragraph above this lemma) that securely computes (q XY , q Z|XY ). Consider the probability distribution,
where (47) follows from privacy against Alice, i.e., (U, W ) − X − (Y, Z), (48) follows from the independence of random variables W and X. Thus we have,
Now, consider the expected length,
This implies that there exists
, there exists a p.m.f. p(u, x, y, z|w * ) achieving the same or smaller expected length and satisfying the required Markov chains. Note that (49) makes sure that correctness condition holds.
Privacy required against both users: We need some definitions first.
Definition 7.
For any x, x ∈ X , we say that x ∼ x , if there exists y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z such that q XY (x, y) > 0, q XY (x , y) > 0 and q Z|XY (z|x, y) > 0, q Z|XY (z|x , y) > 0.
Definition 8. For any two distinct elements x, x of X , we say that x ≡ x , if there exists a sequence x = x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x l−1 , x l = x for some integer l, where x i ∼ x i+1 for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l − 1}.
It can be verified easily that the above defined relation ≡ is an equivalence relation. We know that an equivalence relation partitions the whole space into equivalence classes. Suppose the relation ≡ partitions the space X as X = X 1 X 2 . . . X k , where each X i is an equivalence class, k is the number of equivalence classes, and stands for disjoint union.
Let X EQ := {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k }, where x i is the representative of the equivalence class X i . Now, we define (q XEQY , q Z|XEQY ) as follows:
• Define q XEQY (x i , y) := x∈Xi q XY (x, y) for every (x i , y) ∈ (X EQ × Y).
• For (x i , y) ∈ (X EQ × Y), if there exists x ∈ X i s.t. q XY (x, y) > 0, then define q Z|XEQY (z|x i , y) := q Z|XY (z|x, y), for every z ∈ Z. If there exists no x ∈ X i s. It follows from Lemma 2 proved in Appendix E that, to study the communication complexity of secure computation of (q XY , q Z|XY ), it is enough to study the communication complexity of secure computation of the reduced problem (q XEQY , q Z|XEQY ). To give a rate-optimal code for (q XEQY , q Z|XEQY ), we define the following graph G EQ = (V EQ , E EQ ):
q Z|XEQY (z|x j , y)}. We say that a coloring c : V → {0, 1} * of the vertices of a graph G = (V, E) is proper, if both the vertices of any edge {u, v} have distinct colors, i.e., c(u) = c(v). Claim 1. Every proper coloring of the vertices of G EQ corresponds to a secure code for (q XEQY , q Z|XEQY ), and every secure code for (q XEQY , q Z|XEQY ) corresponds to a collection of proper colorings of the vertices of G EQ .
The above claim is proved in Appendix F. Now we are ready to prove upper and lower bounds on optimal expected length of the message, which is defined as
, where L(U ) denotes the random variable corresponding to the length of U in bits, and minimization is taken over all (p U |X , p Z|U Y ) that perfectly securely computes (q XY , q Z|XY ) with privacy against both users. Theorem 7. Suppose (q XY , q Z|XY ) is perfectly securely computable with privacy against both users. Then
where chromatic entropy H χ (., .) is defined in Definition 5.
Proof: Upper bound: Claim 1 implies that an optimal coloring of G EQ corresponds to a secure code for (q XEQY , q Z|XEQY ). Now, since expected length of any optimal prefix-free binary encoding of a random variable V is upper-bounded by H(V ) + 1 [31, Theorem 5.4.1], we have that the optimal expected length of the message from Alice to Bob is upper-bounded by H χ (G EQ , X EQ ) + 1.
Lower bound: By Claim 1, every secure (randomized) code also corresponds to proper (random) colorings (c r ) r of the graph G. Note that the expected length L(c r ) of any coloring c r is lower-bounded by H(c r (X)), which follows from the fact that the expected length of any prefix-free binary code for a random variable V is lowerbounded by H(V ) [31, Theorem 5.4.1]. Now, since entropy of any coloring is lower-bounded by H χ (G EQ , X EQ ), entropy of the optimal coloring, it follows that E r [L(c r )] ≥ H χ (G EQ , X EQ ). So the expected length of the message is also lower-bounded by H χ (G EQ , X EQ ). Multiple Instances. Alice and Bob have X n and Y n as their inputs, respectively, where (X i , Y i ) ∼ q XY , i.i.d., and Bob wants to compute Z n , which should be distributed according to
Computation should be such that no user learns any additional information about other user's data other than what can be inferred from their own data. It is easy to see that (q X n Y n , q Z n |X n Y n ) is perfectly securely computable with privacy against both users if and only if (q XY , q Z|XY ) is perfectly securely computable with privacy against both users. We can define the graph G n EQ = (X n EQ , E n EQ ) by extending the definition of G EQ in a straightforward manner: X n EQ is the n-fold cartesian product of X EQ , and E n EQ = {{x n , x n } ∈ X n EQ × X n EQ :
n EQ Y n (z n |x n , y n )}. Note that we slightly abused the notation: X n EQ is defined to be the n-fold cartesian product of X EQ , but E n EQ is not the n-fold cartesian product of E EQ .
We define, analogous to the single instance case, L * AB−pvt−n to be the optimal amortized expected length of the message that Alice sends to Bob in this setting. The following is a simple corollary of Theorem 7.
Corollary 2. Suppose (q XY , q Z|XY ) is perfectly securely computable with privacy against both users. Then
Observe that G n EQ is neither the AND-product nor the OR-product of the graph G EQ ; and as far as we know, no single letter expression of
) is known. See [30] for definitions of AND-product and OR-product of graphs.
Privacy required only against Alice: Note that every (q XY , q Z|XY ) is perfectly securely computable with privacy against Alice, since Alice may send X to Bob, and Bob, having Y as his input, may output Z according to q Z|XY . For a given (q XY , q Z|XY ), we define the following characteristic graph G = (X , E), where the edge set is defined as follows:
We define optimal expected length of the message, which is defined as
, where L(U ) denotes the random variable corresponding to the length of U in bits, and minimization is taken over all (p U |X , p Z|U Y ) that perfectly securely computes (q XY , q Z|XY ) with privacy against Alice. Then, the following upper and lower bounds hold.
Proof: We first show that every proper coloring of the vertices of G corresponds to a perfectly secure code for (q XY , q Z|XY ) with privacy against Alice, and every perfectly secure code for (q XY , q Z|XY ) with privacy against Alice corresponds to a collection of proper colorings of the vertices of G. This can be proved along the lines of the proof of Claim 1. Note that Claim 1 is for privacy against both users, but we did not use privacy against Bob in proving that -because Claim 1 is for (q XEQY , q Z|XEQY ), and when we transform our problem from (q XY , q Z|XY ) to (q XEQY , q Z|XEQY ), privacy against Bob becomes redundant. Now, Theorem 8 can be proved along the lines of the proof of Theorem 7. Multiple Instances. The setting is analogous to the multiple instances setting described before, except that we do not require privacy against Bob. Note that we want to securely compute (q X n Y n , q Z n |X n Y n ) with privacy against Alice, where (X i , Y i )'s are i.i.d. according to q XY and q Z n |X n Y n is in product form, i.e., q Z n |X n Y n (z n |x n , y n ) = n i=1 q Z|XY (z i |x i , y i ). Similar to the way we defined G n EQ , we can define the graph G n = (X n , E n ) by extending the definition of G analogously: E n = {{x n , x n } ∈ X n × X n : ∃(y n , z n ) ∈ Y n × Z n s.t. q X n Y n (x n , y n ) > 0, q X n Y n (x n , y n ) > 0 and q Z n |X n Y n (z n |x n , y n ) = q Z n |X n Y n (z n |x n , y n )}. We define, analogous to the single instance case, L * A−pvt−n to be the optimal amortized expected length of the message that Alice sends to Bob in this setting. The following is a simple corollary of Theorem 8.
Corollary 3. Suppose (q XY , q Z|XY ) is perfectly securely computable with privacy against both users. Then
Observe that G n is neither the AND-product nor the OR-product of the graph G EQ ; and as far as we know, no single letter expression of
Privacy required only against Bob: First we explicitly characterize (q XY , q Z|XY ) that are perfectly securely computable with privacy against Bob, where q XY has full support. None of the proofs in this section depends on the specific distribution of q XY as long as it has full support. So the characterization remains the same for all q XY that have full support. For every y ∈ Y, define a set Z (y) = {z ∈ Z : ∃x ∈ X s.t. q Z|XY (z|x, y) > 0}. Essentially, the set Z (y) discards all those elements of Z that never appear as an output when Bob's input is y.
Definition 9. For y ∈ Y, define a relation ≡ y on the set Z (y) as follows: for z, z ∈ Z (y) , we say that z ≡ y z , if there is a constant c > 0 such that q Z|XY (z|x, y) = c · q Z|XY (z |x, y) for every x ∈ X .
It is easy to see that ≡ y is an equivalence relation for every y ∈ Y, which partitions Z (y) into equivalent classes. Consider a y ∈ Y, and let Z (y) = Z is a column vector (whose entries are non-negative and sum up to one, which makes it a unique probability vector) and γ 
Suppose (q XY , q Z|XY ) is perfectly securely computable with privacy against Bob. This implies that there exists a pair of encoder and decoder (p U |X , p Z|U Y ), which induces the joint distribution p XY U Z = q XY p U |X p Z|U Y , that satisfies correctness (i.e., p XY Z = q XY q Z|XY ) and privacy against Bob (i.e., the Markov chain U − (Y, Z) − X holds). Note that the random variable U corresponds to the message that Alice sends to Bob. We define a set U (y) i to be the set of all those messages that Alice can send to Bob, and when Bob, having y as his input outputs an element of Z 
Note that for every y ∈ Y and i ∈ [1 : k(y)], the probability vector α 
With the help of Claim 2 we can show that for every y, y ∈ Y, the corresponding collections of probability vectors { α 
For ease of notation, without loss of generality, we rearrange the indices, to have α
if and only if i = j. Now it follows from Claim 2 and Claim 3 that the message set U and the alphabet Z (y) , for every y ∈ Y, can be partitioned into k parts as follows:
= {z ∈ Z (y) : p(u, z|x, y) > 0 for some x ∈ X , u ∈ U i }. Note that the same U i is used to define Z 
We introduce a new random variable W , which takes values in [k], and is jointly distributed with (X, Y, Z) as follows: define p XY W Z (x, y, i, z) := 0, if p XY Z (x, y, z) = 0; otherwise, define
Comments are in order: (i) We defined p W |X (i|x) to be z∈Z qZ|XY (z|x,y) is same for allx's for which q Z|XY (z|x, y) > 0. It follows from (54)
Note that W is a deterministic function of both U as well as of (Y, Z). Now we are ready to prove upper and lower bounds on optimal expected length of the message, which is defined as
, where L(U ) denotes the random variable corresponding to the length of U in bits, and minimization is taken over all (p U |X , p Z|U Y ) that perfectly securely computes (q XY , q Z|XY ) with privacy only against Bob.
Theorem 10. Suppose (p XY , p Z|XY ) is perfectly securely computable with privacy against Bob, where p XY has full support. Then
Fix an arbitrary pair of encoder and decoder (p U |X , p Z|U Y ) that perfectly securely computes this (q XY , q Z|XY ) with privacy against Bob, i.e., the induced joint distribution p XY U Z = q XY p U |X p Z|U Y satisfies correctness (i.e., q XY Z = q XY q Z|XY ) and privacy against Bob (i.e., U − (Y, Z) − X is a Markov chain). Fix a prefix-free encoding of U . Let L denote the random variable corresponding to the length of this prefix-free encoding of U . We show that We conclude the single instance part of this section by giving an example where common randomness helps to improve the optimal rate, when privacy is required only against Bob (as mentioned in the beginning of Section VI-B). 
for every z. This implies that H(W ) = log 2m. So, from Theorem 10 we have L * B−pvt ≥ log 2m > 1. Whereas it turns out that a rate of 1 is achievable when we use common randomness. To see this, let W be a random variable uniformly distributed on [1 : m]. Alice on seeing W sends X W to Bob using only 1 bit and Bob outputs (W, X W ) since it already has access to W . It is easy to see that this protocol satisfies privacy against Bob. Thus, common randomness helps to improve the optimal rate, when privacy is required only against Bob.
APPENDIX A PROOFS OF THEOREMS 1, 2 & 3
Notation: We use capital letter to denote a random pmf (see e.g., works [32] , [29] ), e.g. P X . For any two sequences of random p.m.f.'s P (n) X and Q (n) X on X (n) (where X (n) is arbitrary and can differ from the cartesian product X n ), we write P X (n) ≈ Q X (n) if E P X (n) − Q X (n) 1 < . For any two sequences of random p.m.f.'s P X (n) and Q X (n) on X (n) , we write
We prove Theorem 2 first and then prove Theorems 1 & 3.
Proof of Theorem 2: Achievability: The proof is broadly along the lines of the proof of interactive channel simulation of Yassaee et al. [6] . We consider two protocols, protocol A and protocol B, where Protocol A corresponds to the source coding side of the problem and Protocol B corresponds to our original problem (with extra shared random variables, one for each round). Each of these protocols will induce a p.m.f. on random variables defined during the protocol. We impose a series of constraints (independence constraints and constraints for the reliability of SW decoders) as done in [6, Theorem 1] so that these two distributions become almost identical. Once we find such constraints making protocol A almost identical to protocol B, we investigate the correctness and privacy properties in addition to eliminating the extra shared randomness. The main difference with the achievability of channel simulation [6] is from (73)-(74) onwards where the requirement of privacy becomes relevant.
We start from source coding side of the problem by fixing a distribution p(u [1:r] , x, y, z [1:2] ) satisfying (5)- (10). Let 
Note that the reliability and independence constraints would remain exactly the same as that of [6, Theorem 1] which are given by
• Independence constraints:
• Constraints for the reliability of SW decoders:
Intuitively, one can understand the above constraints in the following way: Using the OSRB theorem [32, Theorem 1] and noting that U 1 − X − Y , the first independence constraint (61) ensures that (F 1 , w) are nearly uniformly distributed and mutually independent of (X n , Y n ). Similarly, noting that U i − (U 
It follows from (68) and (69) that
where the expectation is taken over random binning. This implies that there exists a particular realization of the random binning with the corresponding p.m.f. p so that we can replace P with p and denote the resulting p.m.f.'s for protocols A and B respectively with p andp, then
(71) alone was sufficient for channel simulation [6] as correctness was the only consideration there, but we need to utilize (72) also in order to account for privacy. We do this with the help of the following claim. From (71) and (72) 
To see this, first we rewrite (71) and (72) as
where n → 0 and δ n → 0 as n → ∞.
. Now, using these it is easy to see that (75) and (76) imply
(77) and (78) imply
Adding (79) and (80) imply that there exists an instance f *
). This proves the claim made in (73) − (74). Marginalizing away m [1:r] and w from (74) and using (73) gives us correctness,p(x n , y n , z n
For privacy, we first show that p(x n , y n , z n
where (81) follows from the fact that p(u [1:r] , x, y, z [1:2] ) satisfies the Markov chain
Thus, we have 
Since mutual information is a continuous function of the probability distribution, (82) − (84) imply 
This is because,
where (88) follows from (8) , and (89) follows from (10) . Similarly, we can show that I(Y ; U [1:r] |X) = I(Y ; Z 1 |X). Also,
where (90) follows from (9), (91) follows from (8), and (92) follows from (10) . This completes the achievability proof of the theorem. Converse: Suppose a rate triple (R 0 , R 12 , R 21 ) is achievable with privacy against both Alice and Bob. Then, there exists a sequence of (n, R 0 , R 12 , R 21 ) protocols such that for every > 0, there exists a large enough n such that
Fix an ∈ (0, 
where (96)- (98) Privacy condition against Bob (95) implies that
where (100) follows from the chain rule, (101)- (104) follow due to the same reasons as that of (96)-(99) with δ := 1 + 2 + 3 so that, δ → 0 as → 0.
It can be shown along similar lines as [6, Theorem 1] that
where g( ) → 0 as → 0. So, we have shown that (R 0 , R 12 , R 21 ) ∈ S (r) for every > 0, where S (r) is defined to be the set of all non-negative rate triples (R 0 , R 12 , R 21 ) for which there exists a p.m.f. p(u [1:r] , x, y, z [1:2] ) such that
where g( ), h 1 ( ) and h 2 ( ) → 0 as → 0. Now we argue that imposing the cardinality bounds 
and 6 more elements to preserve
j=1 |U j | − 1 elements to preserve the joint distribution p X,Y,Z1,Z2,U[1:i−1] , which in turn preserves
and 5 more elements to preserve
Using the continuity of mutual information and total variation distance in the probability simplex, it can be shown (similar to [6, Lemma 6] ) that >0 S (r) is equal to R Proof of Theorem 1: Proof of part (i): It is trivial to see the 'if' part since (5)-(10) define an r-round perfectly secure protocol of blocklength one, i.e., the protocol satisfies (2)-(4) with n = 1 and = 0. For the 'only if' part, it suffices to show that every (q X,Y , q Z1,Z2|X,Y ) that is computable with asymptotic security, is also computable with perfect security. Assume that (q X,Y , q Z1,Z2|X,Y ) is asymptotically securely computable with privacy against both users. This implies that for every > 0, there exists a large enough n and a protocol Π n that satisfies the following conditions:
Single-letterization as done in the converse of the Theorem 2 implies that for every > 0 (by suitably selecting in (111)), there exists a p.m.f. p(u [1:r] , x, y, z 1 , z 2 ) which satisfies the following conditions.
For a fixed (q X,Y , q Z1,Z2|X,Y ), consider the following set.
From (112), it is clear that S is non-empty for every > 0. For a monotonically decreasing sequence 1 > 2 > . . . with lim k→∞ k = 0, it is easy to see that S 1 ⊇ S 2 ⊇ . . . . Now, in order to prove that (q X,Y , q Z1,Z2|X,Y ) is computable with perfect security it suffices to show that S 0 is non-empty. We show this by first arguing that lim k→∞ k i=1 S k is non-empty and then proving that S 0 = lim k→∞ k i=1 S k . Using the continuity of total variation distance and continuity of mutual information we show below that S is compact (bounded and closed) for every > 0. Boundedness of S : For a given (q X,Y , q Z1,Z2|X,Y ), for every p(u, z 1 , z 2 |x, y) that satisfies (113), it follows from the Convex Cover Method [33, Appendix C] along similar lines as cardinality bounds of part (i) that there exists another p.m.f. p(u, z 1 , z 2 |x, y) with
. This implies that all the probability vectors p(u, z 1 , z 2 |x, y) in S are of finite dimension and hence the set S is bounded.
Closedness of S : Consider a sequence of p.m.f.'s p r. Now since I p (k) (U [1:r] ; X, Z 1 |Y, Z 2 ) ≤ , ∀k ∈ N, it follows by taking limit k → ∞ on both sides, that I r (U [1:r] ; X, Z 1 |Y, Z 2 ) ≤ . Similarly we can prove that I r (U [1:r] ; Y, Z 2 |X, Z 1 ) ≤ . Since l 1 -norm is also a continuous function, r X,Y,Z1,Z2 − q X,Y,Z1,Z2 1 ≤ also follows similarly. So, we have r ∈ S and hence S is closed. By Cantor's intersection theorem, which states that a decreasing nested sequence of non-empty compact sets has non-empty intersection, we have that
S k holds trivially because S shrinks as shrinks. For the other direction, assume that γ U[1:r],Z1,Z2|X,Y ∈ lim k→∞ k i=1 S k . For simplicity, we abbreviate γ U[1:r],Z1,Z2|X,Y by γ in the following. Since γ ∈ S k , ∀k, we have I(U [1:r] ; X, Z 1 |Y, Z 2 ) ≤ k , ∀k ∈ N. Now since lim k→∞ k = 0 and mutual information is always non-negative, we have I γ (U [1:r] ; X, Z 1 |Y, Z 2 ) = 0. Similarly, we can prove that I γ (U [1:r] ; Y, Z 2 |X, Z 1 ) = 0 and p X,Y,Z1,Z2 − q X,Y,Z1,Z2 1 | γ = 0. The latter conclusion implies that γ X,Y,Z1,Z2 = q X,Y,Z1,Z2 . This shows that γ ∈ S 0 , which concludes the proof of part (i).
Proof of part (ii): Suppose (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ) is asymptotically securely computable with privacy against both users using an r-round protocol in which Alice starts the communication. Then by part (i), there exists a conditional p.m.f. p(u [1:r] |x, y, z 1 , z 2 ) satisfying (5)- (10) . So, the joint distribution can be written as p(x, y, u [1:r] , z 1 , z 2 ) = q(x, y)p(u [1:r] Notice that p(u [1:r] , z 1 , z 2 |x, y) =p(u [1:r] , z 1 , z 2 |x, y) = p(u [1:r] |x, y)p(z 1 |u [1:r] , x)p(z 2 |u [1:r] , y). We show that p(x, y, u [1:r] , z 1 , z 2 ) also satisfies (5)- (10), thereby making the function (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ) asymptotically securely computable in r-rounds. It is trivial to see that (5)- (8) p(x, y, u [1:r] , z 1 , z 2 ) satisfies (5)- (8),p(x, y, u [1:r] , z 1 , z 2 ) also satisfies (5)- (8) . It remains to show that the p.m.f. p(x, y, u [1:r] , z 1 , z 2 ) satisfies (9)- (10) . For x, y, z 1 , z 2 s.t.p(x, y, z 1 , z 2 ) > 0, consider
= p(u [1:r] |x, y, z 1 , z 2 ).
we have thatp(x, y, u [1:r] , z 1 , z 2 ) satisfies (9)- (10) also. This completes the proof of Theorem 1. Proof of Theorem 3: Part (i) follows directly from Theorem 2. For part (ii), we show that, for the class of functions mentioned in the statement of theorem, if a scheme computes (q XY , q Z1Z2|XY ) with R 12 and R 21 equal to I(Z 2 ; X|Y ) + δ and I(Z 1 ; Y |X) + δ respectively, and with some R 0 , under no privacy, then this scheme will also satisfy the privacy conditions (3)- (4) . From the converse of [6, Theorem 1], we have nR 12 ≥ I(M [1:r] ; X n |Y n , W ). Then we get
where (115) is due to the independence of common randomness W and (X n , Y n ), (116) follows from the Markov chain
. We used the following fact in (118): if two random variables A and A with same support set A satisfy ||p A − p A || 1 ≤ ≤ 1/4, then it follows from [31, Theorem 17.3.3] that |H(A) − H(A )| ≤ η log |A|, where η → 0 as → 0. Now (2) implies (118), where 1 , 2 → 0 as → 0.
When H(Z 1 |X, Y, Z 2 ) = 0, from (118) we have I(M [1:r] , W ; X n , Z n 1 |Y n , Z n 2 ) ≤ δ + 1 + 2 for δ → 0, and 1 , 2 → 0 as → 0, which is the required privacy condition against Bob. Similar argument holds for R 21 when
Proofs of Theorem 4 and Theorem 5 are along similar lines as that of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 jointly, by noticing the following and hence omitted. When privacy against Alice is required,
where (120) follows from (3).
where (122) follows from (3) . Similarly, when privacy is required against Bob, we have I(U [1:r] ;
APPENDIX B CUT-SET BOUNDS FOR RANDOMIZED INTERACTIVE FUNCTION COMPUTATION
For a randomized interactive function computation problem, we prove lower bounds for R 12 and R 21 . To lower bound R 12 , note that all the inequalities upto (117) in the proof of Theorem 3 will follow even for function computation without any privacy requirement. Then we get
where in (124) 
where (126) follows from (5). Now suppose that I(X; Y |U [1:i] ) ≤ I(X; Y ). Assume that i is odd. Then we have
where (127) follows from (6) . One can prove that I(X; Y |U [1:i+1] ) ≤ I(X; Y ) for the case when i is even using (5) . This completes the proof of lemma. The proof of log m + 1 + 1/2 being the optimal sum-rate for any arbitrary rounds follows along similar lines as that of showing that log m + m + 1/2 to be the optimal sum-rate for two round protocols. It is outlined below. We show that H(Y J |U [1:r] , J) = 0. Let us assume H(Y J |U [1:r] , J) = 0. This implies that ∃ u [1:r] and j such that
These two further imply that ∃ y, y such that y(j) = 0, y (j) = 1, and
Now we analyse two cases as before.
This implies the following:
(132), (129) and Lemma 3 imply that
Similarly, (133), (129) and Lemma 3 imply that
From (134) and (135), we get
This condition implies either 
So we have R 21 ≥ 1. From the cut-set bound, we have R 12 ≥ H(Z|Y ) = log m+1/2. This implies that sum-rate is lower bounded by log m + 1/2 + 1 by any r round protocol.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
In view of Theorem 4, it suffices to show that
A similar result for deterministic functions was proved by Orlitsky and Roche [4, Theorem 2]. Since we are dealing with randomized functions, the proof of this proposition is slightly more involved.
≤: Suppose p W |X achieves the minimum on the right hand side. Then W is a random variable such that it takes values in the set Γ (G) of independent sets of G such that X ∈ W . Now we define a joint distribution p XY W Z (x, y, w, z) as follows:
Note that the above-defined p XY W Z satisfies the Markov chains W − X − Y and Z − (X, Y ) − W . These two Markov chain together implies that W − X − (Y, Z) is also a Markov chain. Now we show that p XY W Z satisfies Z − (W, Y ) − X too. Consider any independent set, say w ∈ G. Consider any pair (y, z) ∈ Y × Z. By definition of G, p Z|XY (z|x, y) is the same for all x ∈ w with q XY (x, y) > 0. Hence, p Z|XY (z|x, y) can be uniquely determined from (w, y, z) where x ∈ w; therefore, the Markov chain Z − (W, Y ) − X holds. The inequality now follows by taking U = W .
≥: Suppose p U |X achieves the minimum on the left hand side such that U −X −(Y, Z) and Z −(U, Y )−X hold. Now define a random variable W as a function of U in the following way: w = w(u) := {x : p U X (u, x) > 0}. We need to show that the induced conditional distribution p W |X satisfies the following three conditions: 1) the Markov chain W − X − Y holds; 2) X ∈ W , i.e., p XW (x, w) > 0 =⇒ x ∈ w; and 3) W is an independent set in G = (X , E). We show these conditions below.
1) The Markov chain
3) To prove that w is an independent set we suppose, to the contrary, that w is not an independent set, which means that ∃x, x , u, where w = w(u), x, x ∈ w, {x, x } ∈ E, and such that p U |X (u|x)·p U |X (u|x ) > 0. By definition of G, {x, x } being an edge in E implies that ∃(y, z) ∈ Y × Z such that p Z|XY (z|x, y) = p Z|X,Y (z|x , y) and q XY (x, y) · q XY (x , y) > 0. Assume, without loss of generality, that p Z|XY (z|x, y) > 0. Consider (u, x, y, z). We can expand p U Z|XY (u, z|x, y) in two different ways. The first expansion is as follows:
where in the second equality we used
. We can expand p U Z|XY (u, z|x, y) in the following way also:
where in the second equality we used the Markov chain
and (139) gives
The above equality, together with p Z|XY (z|x, y) > 0, implies p Z|U Y (z|u, y) > 0. Now consider (u, x , y, z), and expand p U Z|XY (u, z|x , y) along the first expansion above in (138). This gives:
Since all the terms on the RHS are greater than zero, we have p U Z|XY (u, z|x , y) > 0. Now expanding p U Z|XY (u, z|x , y) along the second expansion in (139) above gives
On comparing (141) and (142), and using p U |X (u|x ) > 0, we get p Z|XY (z|x , y) = p Z|U Y (z|u, y), which together with (140), leads to a contradiction to our assumption that p Z|XY (z|x, y) = p Z|XY (z|x , y). PROOF OF LEMMA 2
First we explicitly characterize (q XY , q Z|XY ) that are perfectly securely computable with privacy against both users. Kilian [34] gave a characterization of such q Z|XY with no input distribution. Essentially the same characterization holds for general (q XY , q Z|XY ) as well, and we prove it in our language in Lemma 4; it will be useful in understanding the later results.
We say that C × D, where C ⊆ X , D ⊆ Y, is column monochromatic, if for every y ∈ D, if there exists x, x ∈ C such that q XY (x, y), q XY (x , y) > 0, then q Z|XY (z|x, y) = q Z|XY (z|x , y), ∀z ∈ Z.
Lemma 4. [34, Lemma 5.1] Let X = X 1 X 2 . . . X k be the partition induced by the equivalence relation ≡. Then, (q XY , q Z|XY ) is perfectly securely computable with privacy against both users if and only if each X i × Y, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, is column monochromatic.
Proof: (Only if part, ⇒): Let U denote the message sent by Alice to Bob. Let (p(u|x), p(z|u, y)) be a pair of encoder and decoder that perfectly securely computes (q XY , q Z|XY ) with privacy against both users, i.e., the joint distribution p(x, y, u, z) = p(x, y)p(u|x)p(z|u, y) satisfies the following correctness and privacy conditions:
Correctness: p(x, y, z) = q XY (x, y)q Z|XY (z|x, y), ∀x, y, z,
Privacy against Alice:
Privacy against Bob: U − (Y, Z) − X.
Consider an equivalence class X i . First we prove that p(u|x) = p(u|x ) for every message u and every x, x ∈ X i . Since X i is an equivalence class of ≡, we have x ≡ x , and by the definition of x ≡ x , there exists x = x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x l−1 , x l = x such that x i ∼ x i+1 for every 0 ≤ i ≤ l − 1. Consider x i , x i+1 for some i in this sequence. Since x i ∼ x i+1 , there exists y, z such that q(x i , y), q(x i+1 , y), q(z|x i , y), q(z|x i+1 , y) > 0. (These will ensure that all the conditional probabilities in the following equations are well-defined.) Fix a message u and consider the following:
p(u|x i ) = p(u|x i , y, z) = p(u|x i+1 , y, z)
where the first and third equalities follow from (144), and the second equality follows from (145). Since the above argument holds for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k − 1}, we have p(u|x) = p(u|x ) for every x, x ∈ X i . Hence, U is conditionally independent of X, conditioned on the equivalence class to which X belongs. Now take any y ∈ Y. We prove that if there exists x, x ∈ X i such that q XY (x, y) > 0, q XY (x , y) > 0, then q Z|XY (z|x, y) = q Z|XY (z|x , y) for every z ∈ Z. Take any u such that p(u|x) > 0, then p(u|x ) = p(u|x) > 0. Take an arbitrary z ∈ Z. Consider (x, y, u, z) and expand p(u, z|x, y) as follows: p(u, z|x, y) = p(u|x)p(z|u, y).
We can expand p(u, z|x, y) in another way:
p(u, z|x, y) = q(z|x, y)p(u|x, y, z) = q(z|x, y)p(u|x).
In (147) we used (144) to write p(u|x, y, z) = p(u|x). Comparing (146) and (147) we get q(z|x, y) = p(z|u, y).
Running the same arguments with (x , y, u, z) we get q(z|x , y) = p(z|u, y).
Comparing (148) and (149) gives q(z|x, y) = q(z|x , y). Since the protocol is correct, i.e., p(z|x, y) = q Z|XY (z|x, y), we have our desired result that p Z|XY (z|x, y) = p Z|XY (z|x , y).
on that subset it is identical to p U |X . This implies that, since (p U |X , p Z|U Y ) securely computes (q XY , q Z|XY ), the above-defined (pŨ |XEQ , p Z|Ũ Y ) will also securely compute (q XEQY , q Z|XEQY ).
For the other direction, let (pŨ |XEQ , p Z|Ũ Y ) securely computes (q XEQY , q Z|XEQY ). Now consider the following encoder-decoder pair (p U |X , p Z|U Y ) for securely computing (q XY , q Z|XY ). Encoder is defined as follows: for any x ∈ X , define p U |X (u|x) := pŨ |XEQ (u|x i ), where x ∈ X i . Decoder remains the same, i.e., p Z|U Y = p Z|Ũ Y . Note that p U |X (u|x) must be identical for every x in an equivalence class (see the proof of Lemma 4). Therefore, since pŨ |XEQ (u|x i ) is a valid choice for p U |X (u|x i ), where x i is the representative element of the equivalence class X i , it follows that the above-defined encoder-decoder pair (p U |X , p Z|U Y ) will also securely compute (q XY , q Z|XY ).
In the following we show that L(U ) and L(Ũ ) have the same p.m.f. For simplicity, let L = L(U ) andL = L(Ũ ). Equality (a) follows from the fact that l(u), the length of u, is a deterministic function of u. In (b) we used our definition of the encoder pŨ |XEQ (u|x i ) = p U |X (u|x), where x i is the representative element of the equivalence class X i . We also used the definition of p XEQ (x i ) = x∈Xi q X (x) in (c). It follows from Lemma 2 that, to study the communication complexity of secure computation of (q XY , q Z|XY ), it is enough to study the communication complexity of secure computation of the reduced problem (q XEQY , q Z|XEQY ).
APPENDIX F PROOF OF CLAIM 1
⇒: Let c : X EQ → {0, 1} * be a proper coloring of the vertices of G EQ that Alice and Bob agree upon. We will give a pair of encoder-decoder (p U |XEQ , p Z|U Y ) that securely computes (q XEQY , q Z|XEQY ). Our encoder will be a deterministic map, which is defined as p U |XEQ (u|x) := 1 {u=c(x)} . The alphabet of U is U = {a ∈ {0, 1} * : ∃x ∈ X EQ s.t. c(x) = a}. We define our decoder as p Z|U Y (z|u, y) := p Z|XEQY (z|x, y), for any x ∈ X EQ such that c(x) = u and q XEQY (x, y) > 0. The decoder is well-defined, since c is a proper coloring (if x, x are such that c(x) = c(x ), then {x, x } / ∈ E EQ ; therefore, for every (y, z) ∈ Y × Z, q Z|XEQY (z|x, y) = q Z|XEQY (z|x , y), whenever q XEQY (x, y) > 0, q XEQY (x , y) > 0). Note that this pair of encoder-decoder (p U |XEQ , p Z|U Y ) correctly computes (q XEQY , q Z|XEQY ). It also satisfies privacy against both users. Privacy against Alice follows from the fact that our encoder is a deterministic function, in which U is deterministic function of X EQ , which implies that the Markov chain U −X EQ −(Y, Z) trivially holds. Privacy against Bob follows from the fact that X EQ is a deterministic function of (Y, Z); see Remark 7.
⇐: Fix a code C = (p U |XEQ , p Z|U Y ) that securely computes (q XEQY , q Z|XEQY ), i.e., the induced joint distribution
satisfies the two Markov chains U − X EQ − (Y, Z) and U − (Y, Z) − X EQ , which correspond to privacy against Alice and privacy against Bob, respectively. Now we show that, without loss of generality, we can always take the encoder p U |XEQ to be a deterministic map. First note that privacy against Alice U − X EQ − (Y, Z) implies that U − (X EQ , Y ) − Z is a Markov chain. This follows from 0 = I(U ; Y, Z|X EQ ) ≥ I(U ; Z|X EQ , Y ) and the fact that conditional mutual information is always non-negative. The Markov chain U − (X EQ , Y ) − Z implies that, for every x ∈ X EQ , y ∈ Y such that q XEQY (x, y) > 0, we have q Z|XEQY (z|x, y) = p Z|U XEQY (z|u, x, y), for all u ∈ U s.t. p U |X (u|x) > 0
= p Z|U Y (z|u, y).
In (152) we used the (150) to write p Z|U XEQY (z|u, x, y) = p Z|U Y (z|u, y). It follows from (151)-(152) that, for each x ∈ X EQ , if we pick an arbitraryû ∈ U such that p U |X (û|x) > 0, and define our encoder as E(x) :=û (and leave the decoder as before), then the resulting encoder-decoder pair (E(X EQ ), p Z|U Y ) computes (q XEQY , q Z|XEQY ) with zero-error. Note that (E(X EQ ), p Z|U Y ) satisfies privacy against both users: privacy against Alice comes from the fact that the above-defined encoder U = E(X EQ ) is a deterministic function of Alice's input X EQ , which implies that the Markov chain U − X EQ − (Y, Z) trivially holds; privacy against Bob follows from the fact that X EQ is a deterministic function of (Y, Z) (see Remark 7), which implies that the Markov chain U − (Y, Z) − X EQ trivially holds. Note that the encoder p U |XEQ in the given code C may be a randomized function of Alice's input, but once we fix the random coins of the encoder, the encoder becomes deterministic. For fixed random coins r of the encoder, let E r : X EQ → U denote the resulting deterministic encoder, and let C r = (E r (X EQ ), p Z|U Y ) denote the resulting secure code with this deterministic encoder. As argued above, for every choice of random coins r of the encoder, the code C r securely computes (q XEQY , q Z|XEQY ). Since C r is a secure code with zero-error, the coloring defined by c r (x) := E r (x), ∀x ∈ X EQ will be a proper coloring of the vertices of G EQ . Run through the possible random coins r of the encoder; this will produce a random coloring (c r ) r of the vertices, where for any randomness r, the corresponding coloring c r is a proper coloring.
APPENDIX G PROOFS OF CLAIMS 2 & 3
Proof of Claim 2: We prove this by contradiction. Suppose α . Since
i (x ) > 0, we have q Z|XY (z|x, y) > 0 and q Z|XY (z|x , y) > 0 for every z ∈ Z (y) i
. Similarly, since α 
